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Motivational Congruence Theory: Beyond the Dualistic Approach to Human Motivation.

Dualism has long been part of human sciences, including psychology and its sub-discipline of motivation. In psychology, such dualism is reflected in the rationalism-empiricism dichotomy. This dichotomy has resulted in two seemingly contradictory perspectives, including empiricism and rationalism. From empiricism perspective, the primary contact between subject and object is the passive reception of inputs from the environment. From rationalism perspective, the primary contact is through the match between conceptual forms and empirical observations. Relying on the notion of "being-in-the-world", activity theories reconcile these discrepancies by stressing the role of individual's activity in the contact between individual and the world. Similarly, in the motivation literature, such duality is highlighted by the dissection of motivation into intrinsic and extrinsic categories. It has resulted in three contrasting streams on the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. The first stream by reinforcement theories argues that these two motivational mechanisms act in an additive way. The second stream by undermining theories posits that they interact in a negative way. Yet, the third stream by contingency theories postulates that the simultaneous effect of these motivational mechanisms depends on reward salience. These theoretical streams either implicitly or explicitly give priority to one type of motivation over the other. Emphasizing a dialectical stance, motivational congruence theory gives equal weight to both types of motivation. It stipulates that the perceived congruence between motivational mechanisms and context determines overall motivation and performance. The theory goes beyond the dualistic approach in motivation and resolves discrepancies that have long afflicted the literature.

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