We have located links that may give you full text access.
Two Concepts of Conscience and their Implications for Conscience-Based Refusal in Healthcare.
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics : CQ 2017 January
Healthcare professionals are not currently obliged to justify conscientious objections. As a consequence, there are currently no practical limits on the scope of conscience-based refusals in healthcare. Recently, a number of bioethicists, including Christopher Meyers, Robert D. Woods, Robert Card, Lori Kantymir, and Carolyn McLeod, have raised concerns about this situation and have offered proposals to place principled limits on the scope of conscience-based refusals in healthcare. Here, I seek to adjudicate among their proposals. I argue that to adjudicate among them properly it is important to consider the theoretical bases for conscientious objection. I further argue that there are two such bases to be considered. Some conscientious objections are justified by appeal to all-things-considered moral judgments, and some are justified by appeal to the "dictates of conscience." I argue that both of these bases are legitimate and that both should be accommodated in any principled scheme to limit the scope of conscientious refusals in healthcare.
Full text links
Related Resources
Get seemless 1-tap access through your institution/university
For the best experience, use the Read mobile app
All material on this website is protected by copyright, Copyright © 1994-2024 by WebMD LLC.
This website also contains material copyrighted by 3rd parties.
By using this service, you agree to our terms of use and privacy policy.
Your Privacy Choices
You can now claim free CME credits for this literature searchClaim now
Get seemless 1-tap access through your institution/university
For the best experience, use the Read mobile app