We have located links that may give you full text access.
Why the Three-Point Rule Failed to Sufficiently Reduce the Number of Draws in Soccer: An Application of Prospect Theory.
Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology 2015 June
Incentives guide human behavior by altering the level of external motivation. We apply the idea of loss aversion from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) to the point reward systems in soccer and investigate the controversial impact of the three-point rule on reducing the fraction of draws in this sport. Making use of the Poisson nature of goal scoring, we compared empirical results with theoretically deduced draw ratios from 24 countries encompassing 20 seasons each (N = 118.148 matches). The rule change yielded a slight reduction in the ratio of draws, but despite adverse incentives, still 18% more matches ended drawn than expected, t(23) = 11.04, p < .001, d = 2.25, consistent with prospect theory assertions. Alternative point systems that manipulated incentives for losses yielded reductions at or below statistical expectation. This provides support for the deduced concept of how arbitrary aims, such as the reduction of draws in the world's soccer leagues, could be more effectively accomplished than currently attempted.
Full text links
Related Resources
Get seemless 1-tap access through your institution/university
For the best experience, use the Read mobile app
All material on this website is protected by copyright, Copyright © 1994-2024 by WebMD LLC.
This website also contains material copyrighted by 3rd parties.
By using this service, you agree to our terms of use and privacy policy.
Your Privacy Choices
You can now claim free CME credits for this literature searchClaim now
Get seemless 1-tap access through your institution/university
For the best experience, use the Read mobile app