We have located links that may give you full text access.
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance.
American Economic Review 2013 Februrary
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.
Full text links
Related Resources
Get seemless 1-tap access through your institution/university
For the best experience, use the Read mobile app
All material on this website is protected by copyright, Copyright © 1994-2024 by WebMD LLC.
This website also contains material copyrighted by 3rd parties.
By using this service, you agree to our terms of use and privacy policy.
Your Privacy Choices
You can now claim free CME credits for this literature searchClaim now
Get seemless 1-tap access through your institution/university
For the best experience, use the Read mobile app