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Prisoner, dilemma

Pouria Ramazi, James Riehl, Ming Cao
To better understand the intriguing mechanisms behind cooperation among decision-making individuals, we study the simple yet appealing use of preplay communication or cheap talk in evolutionary games, when players are able to choose strategies based on whether an opponent sends the same message as they do. So when playing games, in addition to pure cooperation and defection, players have two new strategies in this setting: homophilic (respectively, heterophilic) cooperation which is to cooperate (respectively, defect) only with those who send the same message as they do...
April 2018: Royal Society Open Science
Robert A Laird
Cooperation is a central topic in evolutionary biology because (a) it is difficult to reconcile why individuals would act in a way that benefits others if such action is costly to themselves, and (b) it underpins many of the 'major transitions of evolution', making it essential for explaining the origins of successively higher levels of biological organization. Within evolutionary game theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games are the main theoretical constructs used to study the evolution of cooperation in dyadic interactions...
May 12, 2018: Journal of Theoretical Biology
John Realpe-Gómez, Giulia Andrighetto, Luis Gustavo Nardin, Javier Antonio Montoya
Cooperation is central to the success of human societies as it is crucial for overcoming some of the most pressing social challenges of our time; still, how human cooperation is achieved and may persist is a main puzzle in the social and biological sciences. Recently, scholars have recognized the importance of social norms as solutions to major local and large-scale collective action problems, from the management of water resources to the reduction of smoking in public places to the change in fertility practices...
April 2018: Physical Review. E
Emma E Levine, Alixandra Barasch, David Rand, Jonathan Z Berman, Deborah A Small
We explore the signal value of emotion and reason in human cooperation. Across four experiments utilizing dyadic prisoner dilemma games, we establish three central results. First, individuals infer prosocial feelings and motivations from signals of emotion. As a result, individuals believe that a reliance on emotion signals that one will cooperate more so than a reliance on reason. Second, these beliefs are generally accurate-those who act based on emotion are more likely to cooperate than those who act based on reason...
May 2018: Journal of Experimental Psychology. General
Philip G Madgwick, Balint Stewart, Laurence J Belcher, Christopher R L Thompson, Jason B Wolf
Contributing to cooperation is typically costly, while its rewards are often available to all members of a social group. So why should individuals be willing to pay these costs, especially if they could cheat by exploiting the investments of others? Kin selection theory broadly predicts that individuals should invest more into cooperation if their relatedness to group members is high (assuming they can discriminate kin from nonkin). To better understand how relatedness affects cooperation, we derived the ‟Collective Investment" game, which provides quantitative predictions for patterns of strategic investment depending on the level of relatedness...
May 7, 2018: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Nishant Malik, Peter J Mucha
We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one strategy at a time (cooperate or defect) across all of its neighbors, changing that strategy and possibly changing partners in response to local changes in the network of player pairing and in the strategies used by connected partners. We compare and contrast numerical simulations with existing pair approximation differential equations for describing this system, as well as more accurate equations developed here using the framework of approximate master equations...
February 2018: Journal of Complex Networks
Andrew M Colman, Briony D Pulford, Eva M Krockow
In the finite-horizon repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, a compelling backward induction argument shows that rational players will defect in every round, following the uniquely optimal Nash equilibrium path. It is frequently asserted that cooperation gradually declines when a Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated multiple times by the same players, but the evidence for this is unconvincing, and a classic experiment by Rapoport and Chammah in the 1960s reported that cooperation eventually recovers if the game is repeated hundreds of times...
May 1, 2018: Acta Psychologica
David G Rand
Does intuition favor prosociality, or does prosocial behavior require deliberative self-control? The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) stipulates that intuition favors typically advantageous behavior - but which behavior is typically advantageous depends on both the individual and the context. For example, non-zero-sum cooperation (e.g. in social dilemmas like the Prisoner's Dilemma) typically pays off because of the opportunity for reciprocity. Conversely, reciprocity does not promote zero-sum cash transfers (e...
November 2017: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Andreina Bruno, Giuseppina Dell'Aversana, Gloria Guidetti
Interpersonal relationship require sophisticated competences of cohabitation. However, the availability of training tools to develop conflict management skills is limited and problematic. The prisoner's dilemma game (PDG), the most widely known example of game theory, a nonzero-sum game, has been used, in higher education, to provide students with an opportunity of active learning and for understanding counterintuitive concepts. It creates a condition of emotive, moral and decisional conflict in and between agents...
2018: Frontiers in Psychology
Alberto Antonioni, María Pereda, Katherine A Cronin, Marco Tomassini, Angel Sánchez
The interplay of social structure and cooperative behavior is under much scrutiny lately as behavior in social contexts becomes increasingly relevant for everyday life. Earlier experimental work showed that the existence of a social hierarchy, earned through competition, was detrimental for the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Here, we study the case in which individuals are ranked in a hierarchical structure based on their performance in a collective effort by having them play a Public Goods Game. In the first treatment, participants are ranked according to group earnings while, in the second treatment, their rankings are based on individual earnings...
March 29, 2018: Scientific Reports
Florian Bitsch, Philipp Berger, Arne Nagels, Irina Falkenberg, Benjamin Straube
Identifying someone else's noncooperative intentions can prevent exploitation in social interactions. Hence, the inference of another person's mental state might be most pronounced in order to improve social decision-making. Here, we tested the hypothesis that brain regions associated with Theory of Mind (ToM), particularly the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), show higher neural responses when interacting with a selfish person and that the rTPJ-activity as well as cooperative tendencies will change over time...
March 26, 2018: Human Brain Mapping
Eva M Krockow, Andrew M Colman, Briony D Pulford
Experimental games have previously been used to study principles of human interaction. Many such games are characterized by iterated or repeated designs that model dynamic relationships, including reciprocal cooperation. To enable the study of infinite game repetitions and to avoid endgame effects of lower cooperation toward the final game round, investigators have introduced random termination rules. This study extends previous research that has focused narrowly on repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games by conducting a controlled experiment of two-player, random termination Centipede games involving probabilistic reinforcement and characterized by the longest decision sequences reported in the empirical literature to date (24 decision nodes)...
March 2018: Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior
Manon K Schweinfurth, Michael Taborsky
Reciprocal cooperation has been observed in a wide range of taxa, but the proximate mechanisms underlying the exchange of help are yet unclear. Norway rats reciprocate help received from partners in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. For donors, this involves accepting own costs to the benefit of a partner, without obtaining immediate benefits in return. We studied whether such altruistic acts are conditional on the communication of the recipient's need. Our results show that in a 2-player mutual food-provisioning task, prospective recipients show a behavioral cascade reflecting increasing intensity...
May 2018: Journal of Comparative Psychology
Yijin Wu, Robert Elliott, Linzi Li, Tongwei Yang, Yusen Bai, Wen Ma
In this paper, we will discuss several ethical issues concerning cadaveric organ donation from the perspective of sociocultural factors that are unique to China under the condition that China has ended the use of executed prisoner's organs for transplants. It is found that though great developments have been made in organ transplantation, the ethical issues relating to organ transplantation still face dilemmas in China. It is argued that organ donation and transplantation in China could make further progress if the ethical issues proposed in this paper can be carefully considered...
March 2018: Medicine (Baltimore)
Jing Li, Liqi Zhu, Zhe Chen
This study examined judgment about punishment and whether punishment promoted cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in children with high-functioning autism (HFA) and typically developing (TD) children. In total, 66 6- to 12-year-olds participated in this study. Children were first asked about judgments regarding rewards and punishment in stories, and then they were asked to play the PDG with a partner in conditions with and without punishment. Results showed that children with HFA believed that hitting others should deserve punishment to a greater extent than TD children did...
July 2018: Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
Frank Stollmeier, Jan Nagler
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of randomness. These temporal variations in the payoffs can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics that are affected by varying payoffs remains difficult. Here we study the impact of arbitrary amplitudes and covariances of temporally varying payoffs on the dynamics...
February 2, 2018: Physical Review Letters
Laura Abbott, Tricia Scott
BACKGROUND: The United Kingdom has the highest incarceration rate in Western Europe. It is known that women in prison are a vulnerable female population who are at risk of mental ill-health due to disadvantaged and chaotic life experiences. Accurate numbers of pregnant women held in UK prisons are not recorded, yet it is estimated that 6%-7% of the female prison population are at varying stages of pregnancy and around 100 babies are born to incarcerated women each year. There are limited published papers that document the departure of the researcher following closure of fieldwork with women in prison...
January 1, 2018: Nursing Ethics
Chen Shen, Chen Chu, Yini Geng, Jiahua Jin, Fei Chen, Lei Shi
Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player successfully enforces its strategy on the opponent, his teaching ability will get an increase...
2018: PloS One
Nastassja Gfrerer, Michael Taborsky
Direct reciprocity can establish stable cooperation among unrelated individuals. It is a common assumption of direct reciprocity models that agents exchange like with like, but this is not necessarily true for natural interactions. It is yet unclear whether animals apply direct reciprocity rules when successive altruistic help involves different tasks. Here, we tested whether working dogs transfer help from one to another cooperative task in an iterated prisoner's dilemma paradigm. In our experiment, individual dogs received help to obtain food from a conspecific, which involved a specific task...
February 2018: Biology Letters
Alessandro Bravetti, Pablo Padilla
Cooperation is a central mechanism for evolution. It consists of an individual paying a cost in order to benefit another individual. However, natural selection describes individuals as being selfish and in competition among themselves. Therefore explaining the origin of cooperation within the context of natural selection is a problem that has been puzzling researchers for a long time. In the paradigmatic case of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), several schemes for the evolution of cooperation have been proposed...
January 31, 2018: Scientific Reports
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