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Norbert Donner-Banzhoff, Judith Seidel, Anna Maria Sikeler, Stefan Bösner, Maria Vogelmeier, Anja Westram, Markus Feufel, Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Odette Wegwarth, Gerd Gigerenzer
BACKGROUND: While dichotomous tasks and related cognitive strategies have been extensively researched in cognitive psychology, little is known about how primary care practitioners (general practitioners [GPs]) approach ill-defined or polychotomous tasks and how valid or useful their strategies are. OBJECTIVE: To investigate cognitive strategies used by GPs for making a diagnosis. METHODS: In a cross-sectional study, we videotaped 282 consultations, irrespective of presenting complaint or final diagnosis...
January 2017: Medical Decision Making: An International Journal of the Society for Medical Decision Making
Gerd Gigerenzer
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
2016: BMJ: British Medical Journal
Henry M Cowles
Like so many things, "trial and error" has a history. The term first emerged as the name for a technique in eighteenth-century mathematics pedagogy. In the nineteenth century, psychologists and biologists transformed "trial and error" from a mathematical tool into a developmental theory, one that could explain both the learning mind and life on earth. "Trial and error" can thus be seen as a case of the larger process whereby the tools we use to explain the world do not just influence but in many ways become our explanations--a process that the psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer has called the "tools-to-theories" heuristic...
September 2015: Isis; An International Review Devoted to the History of Science and its Cultural Influences
Iztok Hozo, Benjamin Djulbegovic, Shenghua Luan, Athanasios Tsalatsanis, Gerd Gigerenzer
RATIONALE, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES: Theories of decision making are divided between those aiming to help decision makers in the real, 'large' world and those who study decisions in idealized 'small' world settings. For the most part, these large- and small-world decision theories remain disconnected. METHODS: We linked the small-world decision theoretic concepts of signal detection theory (SDT) and evidence accumulation theory (EAT) to the threshold model and the large world of heuristic decision making that rely on fast-and-frugal decision trees (FFT)...
December 18, 2015: Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
Ulrich Hoffrage, Stefan Krauss, Laura Martignon, Gerd Gigerenzer
Representing statistical information in terms of natural frequencies rather than probabilities improves performance in Bayesian inference tasks. This beneficial effect of natural frequencies has been demonstrated in a variety of applied domains such as medicine, law, and education. Yet all the research and applications so far have been limited to situations where one dichotomous cue is used to infer which of two hypotheses is true. Real-life applications, however, often involve situations where cues (e.g., medical tests) have more than one value, where more than two hypotheses (e...
2015: Frontiers in Psychology
Laura F Mega, Gerd Gigerenzer, Kirsten G Volz
Arguably the most influential models of human decision-making today are based on the assumption that two separable systems - intuition and deliberation - underlie the judgments that people make. Our recent work is among the first to present neural evidence contrary to the predictions of these dual-systems accounts. We measured brain activations using functional magnetic resonance imaging while participants were specifically instructed to either intuitively or deliberately judge the authenticity of emotional facial expressions...
2015: Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Gerd Gigerenzer
Can the general public learn to deal with risk and uncertainty, or do authorities need to steer people's choices in the right direction? Libertarian paternalists argue that results from psychological research show that our reasoning is systematically flawed and that we are hardly educable because our cognitive biases resemble stable visual illusions. For that reason, they maintain, authorities who know what is best for us need to step in and steer our behavior with the help of "nudges." Nudges are nothing new, but justifying them on the basis of a latent irrationality is...
2015: Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Roman Prinz, Markus A Feufel, Gerd Gigerenzer, Odette Wegwarth
In 1998, Gigerenzer et al. studied how heterosexual men with low-risk behavior were counseled about the accuracy of HIV test results. Most professional counselors conveyed the illusions that false positives do not occur and that a positive HIV test result means that the client is certainly infected. To help improve counseling quality, the authors provided feedback to all counseling centers in Germany. Sixteen years later we assessed whether HIV counseling in Germany has improved by replicating the original study with an expanded sample of 32 randomly selected counseling centers across the country...
2015: Current HIV Research
Gerd Gigerenzer
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
2015: BMJ: British Medical Journal
Peter Haffke, Ronald Hübner
Most models of risky decision making assume that all relevant information is taken into account (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). However, there are also some models supposing that only part of the information is considered (e.g., Brandstätter et al., 2006; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). To further investigate the amount of information that is usually used for decision making, and how the use depends on feedback, we conducted a series of three experiments in which participants choose between two lotteries and where no feedback, outcome feedback, and error feedback was provided, respectively...
2014: Frontiers in Psychology
Andrea Polonioli
This paper discusses Stanovich's appeal to individual differences in reasoning and decision-making to undermine the "adaptive rationality" project put forth by Gigerenzer and his co-workers. I discuss two different arguments based on Stanovich's research. First, heterogeneity in the use of heuristics seems to be at odds with the adaptationist background of the project. Second, the existence of correlations between cognitive ability and susceptibility to cognitive bias suggests that the "standard picture of rationality" (Stein, 1996, 4) is normatively adequate...
February 2015: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
Gerd Gigerenzer
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
2014: BMJ: British Medical Journal
Gerd Gigerenzer, Henry Brighton
Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: (a) the discovery of less-is-more effects; (b) the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; (c) an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; (d) the development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an "adaptive toolbox;" and (e) the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people's adaptive use of heuristics...
January 2009: Topics in Cognitive Science
Henry Brighton, Gerd Gigerenzer
Our programmatic article on Homo heuristicus (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009) included a methodological section specifying three minimum criteria for testing heuristics: competitive tests, individual-level tests, and tests of adaptive selection of heuristics. Using Richter and Späth's (2006) study on the recognition heuristic, we illustrated how violations of these criteria can lead to unsupported conclusions. In their comment, Hilbig and Richter conduct a reanalysis, but again without competitive testing. They neither test nor specify the compensatory model of inference they argue for...
January 2011: Topics in Cognitive Science
Benjamin E Hilbig, Tobias Richter
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) have argued for a "Homo heuristicus" view of judgment and decision making, claiming that there is evidence for a majority of individuals using fast and frugal heuristics. In this vein, they criticize previous studies that tested the descriptive adequacy of some of these heuristics. In addition, they provide a reanalysis of experimental data on the recognition heuristic that allegedly supports Gigerenzer and Brighton's view of pervasive reliance on heuristics. However, their arguments and reanalyses are both conceptually and methodologically problematic...
January 2011: Topics in Cognitive Science
Gerd Gigerenzer
What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: Behavior needs to be studied in social groups as well as in isolation, in natural environments as well as in labs...
July 2010: Topics in Cognitive Science
Shenghua Luan, Lael J Schooler, Gerd Gigerenzer
In a lexicographic semiorders model for preference, cues are searched in a subjective order, and an alternative is preferred if its value on a cue exceeds those of other alternatives by a threshold Δ, akin to a just noticeable difference in perception. We generalized this model from preference to inference and refer to it as Δ-inference. Unlike with preference, where accuracy is difficult to define, the problem a mind faces when making an inference is to select a Δ that can lead to accurate judgments. To find a solution to this problem, we applied Clyde Coombs's theory of single-peaked preference functions...
July 2014: Psychological Review
Nicolai Bodemer, Björn Meder, Gerd Gigerenzer
BACKGROUND: Treatment benefits and harms are often communicated as relative risk reductions and increases, which are frequently misunderstood by doctors and patients. One suggestion for improving understanding of such risk information is to also communicate the baseline risk. We investigated 1) whether the presentation format of the baseline risk influences understanding of relative risk changes and 2) the mediating role of people's numeracy skills. METHOD: We presented laypeople (N = 1234) with a hypothetical scenario about a treatment that decreased (Experiments 1a, 2a) or increased (Experiments 1b, 2b) the risk of heart disease...
July 2014: Medical Decision Making: An International Journal of the Society for Medical Decision Making
Gerd Gigerenzer
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
2014: BMJ: British Medical Journal
Don van Ravenzwaaij, Chris P Moore, Michael D Lee, Ben R Newell
In most decision-making situations, there is a plethora of information potentially available to people. Deciding what information to gather and what to ignore is no small feat. How do decision makers determine in what sequence to collect information and when to stop? In two experiments, we administered a version of the German cities task developed by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), in which participants had to decide which of two cities had the larger population. Decision makers were not provided with the names of the cities, but they were able to collect different kinds of cues for both response alternatives (e...
September 2014: Cognitive Science
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