qualia

The sound environment and music intersect in several ways and the same holds true for the soundscape and our internal response to listening to music. Music may be part of a sound environment or take on some aspects of environmental sound, and therefore some of the soundscape response may be experienced alongside the response to the music. At a deeper level, coping with music, spoken language, and the sound environment may all have influenced our evolution, and the cognitive-emotional structures and responses evoked by all three sources of acoustic information may be, to some extent, the same...

If all aspects of the mind-brain relationship were adequately explained by classical physics, then there would be no need to propose alternatives. But faced with possibly unresolvable puzzles like qualia and free will, other approaches are required. In alignment with a suggestion by Heisenberg in 1958, we propose a model whereby the world consists of two elements: Ontologically real Possibles that do not obey Aristotle's law of the excluded middle, and ontologically real Actuals that do. Based on this view, which bears resemblance to von Neumann's 1955 proposal (von Neumann, 1955), and more recently by Stapp and others (Stapp, 2007; Rosenblum and Kuttner, 2006), measurement that is registered by an observer's mind converts Possibles into Actuals...

Whilst the general presumption of the public is that general anaesthesia prevents awareness of any sensory stimuli, Lennertz and colleagues have shown in this issue of the British Journal of Anaesthesia that 11% of young adults were able to respond to auditory commands when neuromuscular blocking drugs were prevented from reaching one arm using the isolated forearm technique. This occurred with anaesthetic regimens that followed usual clinical practice in each of the 10 countries that enrolled patients, and it was significantly more common in women than in men...

Science and philosophy have long struggled with how to even begin studying the neural or computational basis of qualitative experience. Here I review psychological, neuroscience, and philosophical literature to reveal how perceptual metacognition possesses five unique properties that provide a powerful opportunity for studying the neural and computational correlates of subjective experience: (1) Metacognition leads to subjective experiences (we "feel" confident); (2) Metacognition is "about" internal representations, formalizing introspection; (3) Metacognitive computations are "recursive" (applying to meta-cognition and meta-meta-cognition), so we might discover "canonical computations" preserved across processing levels and implementations; (4) Metacognition is anchored to observable behavior; and (5) Metacognitive computations are unobservable yet hierarchically dependent, requiring development of sensitive, specific models...

The nature of consciousness is considered one of science's most perplexing and persistent mysteries. We all know the subjective experience of consciousness, but where does it arise? What is its purpose? What are its full capacities? The assumption within today's neuroscience is that all aspects of consciousness arise solely from interactions among neurons in the brain. However, the origin and mechanisms of qualia (i.e., subjective or phenomenological experience) are not understood. David Chalmers coined the term "the hard problem" to describe the difficulties in elucidating the origins of subjectivity from the point of view of reductive materialism...

A substantial body of acoustic and behavioural evidence points to the existence of two broad categories of laughter in humans: spontaneous laughter that is emotionally genuine and somewhat involuntary, and volitional laughter that is produced on demand. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that these are also physiologically distinct vocalizations, by measuring and comparing them using real-time magnetic resonance imaging (rtMRI) of the vocal tract. Following Ruch and Ekman (Ruch and Ekman 2001 In Emotions, qualia, and consciousness (ed...

This paper elaborates on a proposal for mapping a configuration space for selector circuits (SCs), defined as the subset of neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) responsible for evoking particular qualia, to its experiential counterpart, experience-space (E-space), as part of an investigation into the nature of conscious experience as it first emerged in evolution. The dimensionality of E-space, meaning the degrees of freedom required to specify the properties of related sets of qualia, is at least two, but the utility of E-space as a hypothetical construct is much enhanced by assuming it is a large dimensional space, with at least several times as many dimensions as there are categories of qualia to occupy them...

The program of "neurophenomenal structuralism" is presented as an agenda for a genuine structuralist neuroscience of consciousness that seeks to understand specific phenomenal experiences as strictly relational affairs. The paper covers a broad range of topics. It starts from considerations about neural change detection and relational coding that motivate a solution of the Newman problem of the brain in terms of spatiotemporal relations. Next, phenomenal quality spaces and their Q-structures are discussed. Neurophenomenal structuralism proclaims a homomorphic mapping of the structures of self-organized neural maps in the brain onto Q-structures, and it will be demonstrated how this leads to a new and special version of structural representationalism about phenomenal content...

In the study of consciousness, qualia, the individual subjective experience, is neglected. It remains impenetrable because the objective perspective used for scientific investigations misses its subjective nature. In 1974, Thomas Nagel suggested that studying qualia requires an "objective phenomenology method" whose goal would be to describe the subjective character of experiences in an independent manner. We introduce a corresponding theoretical and experimental framework based on the "idiosyncrasy principle...

In this paper we address the following problems and provide realistic answers to them: (1) What could be the physical substrate for subjective, phenomenal, consciousness (P-consciousness)? Our answer: the electromagnetic (EM) field generated by the movement and changes of electrical charges in the brain. (2) Is this substrate generated in some particular part of the brains of conscious entities or does it comprise the entirety of the brain/body? Our answer: a part of the thalamus in mammals, and homologous parts of other brains generates the critical EM field...

Upon a brief glance, how well can we differentiate what we see from what we do not? Previous studies answered this question as 'poorly'. This is in stark contrast with our everyday experience. Here, we consider the possibility that previous restriction in stimulus variability and response alternatives reduced what participants could express from what they consciously experienced. We introduce a novel massive report paradigm that probes the ability to differentiate what we see from what we do not. In each trial, participants viewed a natural scene image and judged whether a small image patch was a part of the original image...

A positive experience in response to a piece of music or a work of art (hence 'music/art') has been linked to health and wellbeing outcomes but can often be reported as indescribable (ineffable), creating challenges for research. What do these positive experiences feel like, beyond 'positive'? How are loved works that evoke profoundly negative emotions explained? To address these questions, two simultaneously occurring classes of experience are proposed: the 'emotion class' of experience (ECE) and the positive 'affect class' of experience (PACE)...

Frame Semantics includes context as a central aspect of the theory. Frames themselves can be regarded as a representation of the immediate context against which meaning is to be construed. Moreover, the notion of frame invocation includes context as one possible source of information comprehenders use to construe meaning. As the original implementation of Frame Semantics, Berkeley FrameNet is capable of providing computational representations of some aspects of context, but not all of them. In this article, we present FrameNet Brasil: a framenet enriched with qualia relations and capable of taking other semiotic modes as input data, namely pictures and videos...

Qualitative relationships between two instances of conscious experiences can be quantified through the perceived similarity. Previously, we proposed that by defining similarity relationships as arrows and conscious experiences as objects, we can define a category of qualia in the context of category theory. However, the example qualia categories we proposed were highly idealized and limited to cases where perceived similarity is binary: either present or absent without any gradation. Here, we introduce enriched category theory to address the graded levels of similarity that arises in many instances of qualia...

Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind-Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory-will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world...

The QBIT theory is a recently introduced multi-disciplinary approach to the problem of consciousness. One of the main axioms of the theory is that when information-theoretic certainty of an observer about a stimulus goes beyond a certain threshold, the observer becomes conscious of that stimulus. This axiom could provide an explanation for how the brain generates consciousness.In short, the QBIT theory suggests that the brain generates consciousness by reducing the entropy of its internal representations below a critical threshold...

The similarities between amphioxus and vertebrate brains, in their regional subdivision, cell types and circuitry, make the former a useful benchmark for understanding the evolutionary innovations that shaped the latter. Locomotory control systems were already well developed in basal chordates, with the ventral neuropile of the dien-mesencephalon serving to set levels of activity and initiate locomotory actions. A chief deficit in amphioxus is the absence of complex vertebrate-type sense organs. Hence, much of vertebrate story is one of progressive improvement both to these and to sensory experience more broadly...

There are at least two approaches to the definition of consciousness. In the first case, certain aspects of consciousness, called qualia, are considered inaccessible for research from a third person and can only be described through subjective experience. This approach is inextricably linked with the so-called "hard problem of consciousness", that is, the question of why consciousness has qualia or how any physical changes in the environment can generate subjective experience. With this approach, some aspects of consciousness, by definition, cannot be explained on the basis of external observations and, therefore, are outside the scope of scientific research...

Rejecting the received account, which includes procedural and semantic memory, Stanley B. Klein claims that only episodic memory is genuine memory. This is so, he asserts, because only episodic memory is partly constituted by a quale, a Nagelian "what it is like" feeling of the past. However, his actual position reveals a very different set of claims about memory, one that involves a distinctive feel, distinct from Nagelian qualia and other versions of what qualia are. We argue that Klein's actual position significantly differs from what he claims memory is...

Conscious experience can be treated as a complex unified whole, but to do so is problematic from an evolutionary perspective if, like other products of evolution, consciousness had simple beginnings, and achieved complexity only secondarily over an extended period of time as new categories of subjective experience were added and refined. The premise here is twofold, first that these simple beginnings can be investigated regardless of whether the ultimate source of subjective experience is known or understood, and second, that of the contents known to us, the most accessible for investigation will be those that are, or appear, most fundamental, in the sense that they resist further deconstruction or analysis...