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Luke Semrau
Erik Malmqvist defends the prohibition on kidney sales as a justifiable measure to protect individuals from harms they have not autonomously chosen. This appeal to 'group soft paternalism' requires that three conditions be met. It must be shown that some vendors will be harmed, that some will be subject to undue pressure to vend, and that we cannot feasibly distinguish between the autonomous and the non-autonomous. I argue that Malmqvist fails to demonstrate that any of these conditions are likely to obtain...
October 21, 2016: Bioethics
Samia A Hurst, Alex Mauron
Assisting suicide is legal in Switzerland if it is offered without selfish motive to a person with decision-making capacity. Although the 'Swiss model' for suicide assistance has been extensively described in the literature, the formally and informally protected liberties and claims of assistors and recipients of suicide assistance in Switzerland are incompletely captured in the literature. In this article, we describe the package of rights involved in the 'Swiss model' using the framework of Hohfeldian rights as modified by Wenar...
October 21, 2016: Bioethics
Brian Kaplan
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
October 21, 2016: Bioethics
Julian Savulescu, Udo Schuklenk
In an article in this journal, Christopher Cowley argues that we have 'misunderstood the special nature of medicine, and have misunderstood the motivations of the conscientious objectors'. We have not. It is Cowley who has misunderstood the role of personal values in the profession of medicine. We argue that there should be better protections for patients from doctors' personal values and there should be more severe restrictions on the right to conscientious objection, particularly in relation to assisted dying...
September 22, 2016: Bioethics
(no author information available yet)
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
November 2016: Bioethics
Udo Schuklenk
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
November 2016: Bioethics
(no author information available yet)
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
November 2016: Bioethics
Shawneequa L Callier, Rachel Abudu, Maxwell J Mehlman, Mendel E Singer, Duncan Neuhauser, Charlisse Caga-Anan, Georgia L Wiesner
PURPOSE: This review identifies the prominent topics in the literature pertaining to the ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) raised by research investigating personalized genomic medicine (PGM). METHODS: The abstracts of 953 articles extracted from scholarly databases and published during a 5-year period (2008-2012) were reviewed. A total of 299 articles met our research criteria and were organized thematically to assess the representation of ELSI issues for stakeholders, health specialties, journals, and empirical studies...
November 2016: Bioethics
Merle Spriggs, Lynn Gillam
Is Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery for an adolescent with Body Dysmorphic Disorder ever ethically justified? Cosmetic genital surgery (specifically labioplasty) for adolescent girls is one of the most ethically controversial forms of cosmetic surgery and Body Dysmorphic Disorder is typically seen as a contraindication for cosmetic surgery. Two key ethical concerns are (1) that Body Dysmorphic Disorder undermines whatever capacity for autonomy the adolescent has; and (2) even if there is valid parental consent, the presence of Body Dysmorphic Disorder means that cosmetic surgery will fail in its aims...
November 2016: Bioethics
Joona Räsänen
Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article 'After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?' has received a lot of criticism since its publishing. Part of the recent criticism has been made by pro-life philosopher Christopher Kaczor, who argues against infanticide in his updated book 'Ethics of Abortion'. Kaczor makes four arguments to show where Giubilini and Minerva's argument for permitting infanticide goes wrong. In this article I argue that Kaczor's arguments, and some similar arguments presented by other philosophers, are mistaken and cannot show Giubilini and Minerva's view to be flawed...
November 2016: Bioethics
William Simkulet
Proponents of the substance view contend that abortion is seriously morally wrong because it is killing something with the same inherent value and right to life as you or I. Rob Lovering offers two innovative criticisms of the anti-abortion position taken by the substance view - the rescue argument and the problem of spontaneous abortion. Henrik Friberg-Fernros offers an interesting response to Lovering, but one I argue would be inconsistent with the anti-abortion stance taken by most substance view theorists...
November 2016: Bioethics
William Simkulet
Recently philosophers have proposed a wide variety of interventions referred to as 'moral enhancements'. Some of these interventions are concerned with helping individuals make more informed decisions; others, however, are designed to compel people to act as the intervener sees fit. Somewhere between these two extremes lie interventions designed to direct an agent's attention either towards morally relevant issues - hat-hanging - or away from temptations to do wrong - hat-hiding. I argue that these interventions fail to constitute genuine moral enhancement because, although they may result in more desirable outcomes - more altruism, more law-following, and/or less self-destructive behavior, they ignore a person's intentions, and often what makes an action right or wrong is the intent behind it...
November 2016: Bioethics
Timothy F Murphy
Antinatalist commentators recommend that humanity bring itself to a close, on the theory that pain and suffering override the value of any possible life. Other commentators do not require the voluntary extinction of human beings, but they defend that outcome if people were to choose against having children. Against such views, Richard Kraut has defended a general moral obligation to people the future with human beings until the workings of the universe render such efforts impossible. Kraut advances this view on the grounds that we are obliged to exercise beneficence toward others and on the grounds that the goods available in human lives are morally compelling...
November 2016: Bioethics
Govert den Hartogh
In suicidology, the common view is that 'rational' suicides occur only rarely, because the competence of people who want to end their lives is compromised by mental illness. In the Netherlands and Flanders, however, patients' requests for euthanasia or assistance in suicide are granted in 5300 and 1400 cases a year respectively, and in all these cases at least two doctors have confirmed the patient's competence. The combination of these two findings is puzzling. In other countries one would expect at least some of these people to end their own lives...
November 2016: Bioethics
Sagar Sanyal
Allen Buchanan has argued for a linking of the ethics of human enhancement to the ethics of development more generally. The promise of the 'enhancement enterprise' is that it may help develop society, just as other technological advances have in the past. He proposes a framework of intellectual property rights, government action to ensure the poor can access the enhancements, an international organization to administer the diffusion of new enhancement technologies from the West to poor countries, and the diffusion within countries to the poorer populations...
November 2016: Bioethics
Thomas Ploug, Søren Holm
In this article we provide an in-depth description of a new model of informed consent called 'meta consent' and consider its practical implementation. We explore justifications for preferring meta consent over alternative models of consent as a solution to the problem of secondary use of health data for research. We finally argue that meta consent strikes an appropriate balance between enabling valuable research and protecting the individual.
November 2016: Bioethics
Andrew Botterell
According to Rivka Weinberg, gametes are like enriched uranium: both are hazardous materials. Exposing human beings to enriched uranium can result in radioactivity and decreased life expectancy, while exposing sperm and ova to each other can result in the creation of needy innocent persons with full moral status. Weinberg argues that when we engage in activities that put our gametes at risk of joining with others and growing into persons, we assume the costs of that risky activity. She calls this the Hazmat Theory of parental responsibility...
November 2016: Bioethics
Jukka Varelius
The view that voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should be made available for terminal patients only is typically warranted by reference to the risks that the procedures are seen to involve. Though they would appear to involve similar risks, the commonly endorsed end-of-life practices referred to as passive euthanasia are available also for non-terminal patients. In this article, I assess whether there is good reason to believe that the risks in question would be bigger in the case of voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide than in that of passive euthanasia...
November 2016: Bioethics
Faye Tucker
Adolescents, in many jurisdictions, have the power to consent to life saving treatment but not necessarily the power to refuse it. A recent defence of this asymmetry is Neil Manson's theory of 'transitional paternalism'. Transitional paternalism holds that such asymmetries are by-products of sharing normative powers. However, sharing normative powers by itself does not entail an asymmetry because transitional paternalism can be implemented in two ways. Manson defends the asymmetry-generating version of transitional paternalism in the clinical context, arguing that it maximizes respect for adolescent autonomy...
November 2016: Bioethics
Ton Vink
My main purpose in this article is to establish the meaning of a 'good death' when death is self-chosen. I will take as my point of departure the new notion of 'self-euthanasia' and the corresponding practice that has evolved in the Netherlands in recent years. Both physician-euthanasia and self-euthanasia refer to an ideal process of a good death, the first being ultimately the physician's responsibility, while the second is definitely the responsibility of the individual choosing to die. However, if we also accept the existence of a fundamental moral difference between ending another person's life and ending your own life, and if we accept this moral difference to be also relevant to the normatively laden good death, then this difference represents a strong reason for preferring self-euthanasia to physician-euthanasia...
November 2016: Bioethics
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