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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

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https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29857804/a-new-twist-to-the-no-miracles-argument-for-the-success-of-science
#1
K Brad Wray
J. D. Trout has recently developed a new defense of scientific realism, a new version of the No Miracles Argument. I critically evaluate Trout's novel defense of realism. I argue that Trout's argument for scientific realism and the related explanation for the success of science are self-defeating. In the process of arguing against the traditional realist strategies for explaining the success of science, he inadvertently undermines his own argument.
June 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29857803/cartesian-critters-can-t-remember
#2
Devin Sanchez Curry
Descartes held the following view of declarative memory: to remember is to reconstruct an idea that you intellectually recognize as a reconstruction. Descartes countenanced two overarching varieties of declarative memory. To have an intellectual memory is to intellectually reconstruct a universal idea that you recognize as a reconstruction, and to have a sensory memory is to neurophysiologically reconstruct a particular idea that you recognize as a reconstruction. Sensory remembering is thus a capacity of neither ghosts nor machines, but only of human beings qua mind-body unions...
June 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29857802/the-whewell-mill-debate-on-predictions-from-mill-s-point-of-view
#3
Cornelis Menke
John Stuart Mill, in his debate with William Whewell on the nature and logic of induction, is regarded as being the first to dismiss the supposed value of successful predictions as merely psychological. I shall argue that this view of the Whewell-Mill debate on predictions misconstrues Mill's position and argument. From Mill's point of view, the controversial point was not the question whether predictions 'count more' than ex-post explanations but the alleged assertion by Whewell that the successful predictions of the wave theory of light prove the existence of the ether...
June 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29857801/scientists-as-experts-a-distinct-role
#4
Torbjørn Gundersen
The role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that there is a normatively relevant difference between the two roles, whereas the inseparability view denies that there is such a difference...
June 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29857800/how-to-be-rational-about-empirical-success-in-ongoing-science-the-case-of-the-quantum-nose-and-its-critics
#5
Ann-Sophie Barwich
Empirical success is a central criterion for scientific decision-making. Yet its understanding in philosophical studies of science deserves renewed attention: Should philosophers think differently about the advancement of science when they deal with the uncertainty of outcome in ongoing research in comparison with historical episodes? This paper argues that normative appeals to empirical success in the evaluation of competing scientific explanations can result in unreliable conclusions, especially when we are looking at the changeability of direction in unsettled investigations...
June 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29857799/natural-classification-and-pierre-duhem-s-historical-work-which-relationships
#6
Sonia Maria Dion
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
June 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29857798/inductive-reasoning-in-the-context-of-discovery-analogy-as-an-experimental-stratagem-in-the-history-and-philosophy-of-science
#7
Amy A Fisher
Building on Norton's "material theory of induction," this paper shows through careful historical analysis that analogy can act as a methodological principle or stratagem, providing experimentalists with a useful framework to assess data and devise novel experiments. Although this particular case study focuses on late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century experiments on the properties and composition of acids, the results of this investigation may be extended and applied to other research programs...
June 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29857797/schelling-s-method-of-darstellung-presenting-nature-through-experiment
#8
Jelscha Schmid
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
June 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29857796/%C3%A3-milie-du-ch%C3%A3-telet-s-interpretation-of-the-laws-of-motion-in-the-light-of-18th-century-mechanics
#9
Andrea Reichenberger
Émilie Du Châtelet is well known for her French translation of Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica. It is the first and only French translation of Newton's magnum opus. The complete work appeared in 1759 under the title Principes mathématiques de la philosophie naturelle, par feue Madame la Marquise Du Chastellet. Before translating Newton's Principia, Du Châtelet worked on her Institutions de physique. In this book she defended the Leibnizian concept of living forces - vis viva. This paper argues that both of these works were part of a critical transformation and consolidation of post-Newtonian mechanics in the early 18th century, beyond Newton and Leibniz...
June 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609778/the-realizers-and-vehicles-of-mental-representation
#10
Zoe Drayson
The neural vehicles of mental representation play an explanatory role in cognitive psychology that their realizers do not. Cognitive psychology individuates neural structures as representational vehicles in terms of the specific causal properties to which cognitive mechanisms are sensitive. Explanations that appeal to properties of vehicles can capture generalisations which are not available at the level of their neural realizers. In this paper, I argue that the individuation of realizers as vehicles restricts the sorts of explanations in which they can participate...
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609777/integrating-mechanistic-explanations-through-epistemic-perspectives
#11
Lena Kästner
Talk of levels is ubiquitous in philosophy, especially in the context of mechanistic explanations spanning multiple levels. The mechanistic conception of levels, however, does not allow for the kind of integration needed to construct such multi-level mechanistic explanations integrating observations from different scientific domains. To address the issues arising in this context, I build on a certain perspectival aspect inherent in the mechanistic view. Rather than focusing on compositionally related levels of mechanisms, I suggest analyzing the situation in terms of epistemic perspectives researchers take when making scientific observations...
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609776/saving-the-mutual-manipulability-account-of-constitutive-relevance
#12
Beate Krickel
Constitutive mechanistic explanations are said to refer to mechanisms that constitute the phenomenon-to-be-explained. The most prominent approach of how to understand this relation is Carl Craver's mutual manipulability approach (MM) to constitutive relevance. Recently, MM has come under attack (Baumgartner and Casini 2017; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Harinen 2014; Kästner 2017; Leuridan 2012; Romero 2015). It is argued that MM is inconsistent because, roughly, it is spelled out in terms of interventionism (which is an approach to causation), whereas constitutive relevance is said to be a non-causal relation...
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609775/in-defense-of-interventionist-solutions-to-exclusion
#13
Thomas W Polger, Lawrence A Shapiro, Reuben Stern
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609774/realizability-and-the-varieties-of-explanation
#14
Philippe Huneman
What realization is has been convincingly presented in relation to the way we determine what counts as the realizers of realized properties. The way we explain a fact of realization includes a reference to what realization should be; therefore it informs in turn our understanding of the nature of realization. Conceptions of explanation are thereby included in the views of realization as a metaphysical property. Recently, several major views of realization such as Polger and Shapiro's or Gillett and Aizawa's, however competing, have relied on the neo-mechanicist theory of explanations (e...
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609773/physicalism-realization-and-structure
#15
Gary Fuller
In the philosophy of mind and psychology, a central question since the 1960s has been that of how to give a philosophically adequate formulation of mind-body physicalism. A large quantity of work on the topic has been done in the interim. There have been, and continue to be, extensive discussions of the ideas of physicalism, identity, functionalism, realization, and constitution. My aim in this paper is a modest one: it is to get clearer about these ideas and some of their interrelations. After providing some background and history, I shall focus on two related topics: the distinction between a functional property and a structural one and the dispute over whether a realization account of the mental-physical relation provides a better physicalist account than a constitutional account...
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609772/multiple-realization-and-multiple-ways-of-realization-a-progress-report
#16
Kenneth Aizawa
One might have thought that if something has two or more distinct realizations, then that thing is multiply realized. Nevertheless, some philosophers have claimed that two or more distinct realizations do not amount to multiple realization, unless those distinct realizations amount to multiple "ways" of realizing the thing. Corey Maley, Gualtiero Piccinini, Thomas Polger, and Lawrence Shapiro are among these philosophers. Unfortunately, they do not explain why multiple realization requires multiple "ways" of realizing...
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609771/cognition-wars
#17
Fred Adams
In what kinds of physical systems can cognition be realized? There are currently competing answers among scientists and theorists of cognition. There are many plant scientists who maintain that cognition can be realized in plants. There are biological scientists who maintain that cognition is materially realized in bacteria. In this paper, I will present the basis for such claims and evaluate them and discuss the future for theories of the metaphysical basis of cognition in the cognitive sciences.
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609770/reduction-redux
#18
Lawrence Shapiro
Putnam's criticisms of the identity theory attack a straw man. Fodor's criticisms of reduction attack a straw man. Properly interpreted, Nagel offered a conception of reduction that captures everything a physicalist could want. I update Nagel, introducing the idea of overlap, and show why multiple realization poses no challenge to reduction so construed.
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29609769/introduction-multiple-realizability-and-levels-of-reality
#19
EDITORIAL
Alex Manafu
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
April 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
https://www.readbyqxmd.com/read/29458950/a-reply-to-craver-and-povich-on-the-directionality-of-distinctively-mathematical-explanations
#20
Marc Lange
No abstract text is available yet for this article.
February 2018: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
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